

Fellow-Subjects from entring into it; by artfully endeavouring to depreciate our own Strength, and enlarge upon that of the Enemy. Were such fallacious Arguments true; *no future Time* would be proper for us to prosecute the War in, and consequently we must be contented to submit to the most infamous, as well as barbarous Treatment, which that Nation might be pleased to bestow upon us, without ever presuming to go one Step farther, than to present *humble* and *submissive* Memorials to that perfidious Court. But although this has been insinuated by the Tools of the *A——n*, yet I believe none will now be found hardy enough to insist upon such Absurdities. I rather am of Opinion, that the M———r himself is by this Time *asham'd* of his favourite Piece, if *Shame* has not totally left him. As he can't but be fully convinced, that the many positive Assertions contain'd therein, are equally *Weak* and *Wicked*. And cannot be view'd by any considerate Person, who wishes well to his Country, without Horrour and Detestation! arising from a firm Persuasion, that such destructive Arguments (which tended to expose our *Weaknesses*, if we had any) could proceed from none but those who possess'd *weak Heads*, or *corrupted Hearts*.

F I N I S.

OPINIONS

DELIVERED BY THE

EARL of *ESSEX*,

Lord *Burleigh*, *Ld. Willoughby*,
Lord *Burrough*, Lord *North*, Sir
William Knollys, Sir *Walter Raleigh*,
and Sir *George Carew*,

ON

The ALARUM of an INVASION
from *Spain* in the Year 1596,

AND

The MEASURES proper to be
taken on that OCCASION.

L O N D O N :

Printed for M. COOPER, in *Pater-noster Row*,
near *St. Paul's*.

[Price One Shilling.]

Dr 202.1.1.255

OPINIONS

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EARL OF ARKLEY

Lord Burleigh, Lord Willoughby,
Lord Burrough, Lord North, Sir
William Knollys, Sir Walter Raleigh,
and Sir George Carter.

The ALARM of an INVASION
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The MEASURES proper to be
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THE PREFACE.

I Cannot be so uncourtly and impolite, while I am ushering into the World the Sentiments of Burleigh, Essex, and other great Men of former Times, to omit this Opportunity of bestowing some few Compliments, and making a short Comparison between the present Ministry and them. For when we set Eyes on such a first C—r of the Tre—y, who envies former Times their Burleigh? When such a Commander of a late Expedition presents himself; how is the Glory
of

*of Howard and Essex eclipsed? And for a Sec---y of St--- adroit in Intelligence; and by more than twenty Years exercise of a fine Understanding in Foreign Negotiations formed through all the Degrees of Improvement, into Perfection of Skill and Policy; it is worth while for the Honour of the present Age to view him set in Opposition to Walsingham. I will not enter into Particulars from which they in their great Modesty, since a minute Examination would turn out so visibly to their Advantage, will I dare say readily excuse me, as will I hope a great many others whom I have not here the honour to name; Let it suffice, that the greatest Part (a few only excepted, for where could so great a Number have been found to have compleated such an Assemblage of illustrious Persons) are of one Stamp, and far from lessening, reflect like a Constellation mutual Honour on one another as well as the Nation who
never*

P R E F A C E.

v

never before was so provided for in Men of such Abilities, and not to conceal my too great Partiality perhaps for the Honour of the Time in which I live, I hope never will again. The Credit of the Nation is made to appear in the many Millions which she owes, and her Strength and Prowess in maintaining a War with insuperable Obstinacy, tho' attended with so many Misfortunes. Could one of those great Men I have been mentioning arise, or could he have viewed for some Years past this Nation so excised, so taxed, so corrupt, so dispirited, every thing Mortgaged, Officers and Tax-gatherers in every Part of the Country, an Army during Peace hurtful to ourselves, but Affairs so conducted, that during War, it is not at all so to our Enemies; Into what Grief would he burst? how would he exclaim? Is this my Country?

O

* O cara Genitrice ; O dal tuo figlio
 A pena Riconosciuta——
 Son queste le contrade
 Si chiare un tempo ? Pastor Fido.

With regard to the Pieces before us, I will say little in their Commendation, for I would not pretend that any thing I could say would add to the Credit of those great Men, any more than 'tis possible to take from that of some of later Date. I will only observe that these Reflexions arising on the Preparations made by Spain in the Year 1596, which was preceded by that famous Armament in 1588, have the Advantage of second Thoughts and greater Maturity. As France will very possibly repay the Visit which we made them last Year, and be provoked to make some Attempt on this Country, it may give some Satisfaction to see the Deliberations of Men so renowned on a similar Case,

* O my dear Parent, O by thy Son
 Scarce to be recollected,
 Is this the Country once so Renown'd.

Case, and the Methods plann'd out on that Occasion. I am satisfied that our Ministry so much abler in themselves, stand little in need of the Advice of a Burleigh or Raleigh; but if they should deign to make any Use of their Councils, on any Emergency, and these Papers thereby become of any Service to the Publick, either by preventing wrong, or setting right Measures on Foot, I should receive a greater Pleasure than I at present can pretend to expect. However, I had another Reason for communicating these Opinions to the Public, because it will thereby appear what Danger is to be apprehended from the Efforts of an Invader, and consequently how great or little Stress (according to the Judgment of Men famous to Posterity, for their Knowledge and Ability, and who were not biass'd in this Affair by the Prejudices of Parties, into which we are at present divided) ought to be laid on those Arguments, which are
now-

now-a-days urged for keeping up a Standing Army in Time of Peace, provided the People be not so treated, as to be driven thro' Madnefs. and Despair to abet and second a foreign Force landing in these Kingdoms.



ARTICLES

ARTICLES

Propounded by

ROBERT *Earl of Essex,**Upon the Alarum geven by the Spaniards,*

Anno 1596.

BESIDES many Aduertisements of the great Preparations of *Spaine*, of their forwardnes, or rather full readines to set Sayle, of their purpose to come for *England*: It is now tould us by two of our owne Contriemen, Captains of two *English* Barks, and confessed by the *Portingals*, whom they tooke Prisonners uppon that Coast: That the *Adelantado* in Personne with 20^{tie} Ships of the Kinges and 70^y others Transporters of Souldiers, ded sett out of *Lisbone* more then three Weekes since. And that the 18th Day of the last Moneth after our Accoumpt he was neere the Cape *Finis Terræ*, and ded the next Day putt into the *Groine* or *Feroll*. To this which they deliuer uppon Knowledge, they add Reportes, that there were many other Shippes to joyne with his Fleet, which came out of the *Straightes*: Some from *Andelozia*, and some from *Biskay*, and the Northe.

B

Upon

Upon this Aduertisement may growe two Questions.

I. The first, whether they will come presently, hoping to take us vnprovided, or staye till the Spring, when they may come in greater Strenght, and haue a better Season of the Yearre?

II. The other; whether they intend an Inuasion, or only an Incurfion?

III. If Incurfion (though it be impossible to prouide euerye where) yet howe he is to be impeached from making any dangerous Incurfion to us, or greatly prejudiciall to our State?

IV. If Inuasion; which are the Portes he is lykeliest to seeke to lodge in?

V. Whether any Places that are of Importance nere to those Partes, being now vndefensibie, should be fortified, or not?

VI. Howe if the *Spaniards* be lodged in any Porte, we shall seeke to dispossesse them?

VII. Howe wee shall keep them from makinge any great progresse or farre marche into the Hart of our Countrey.

VIII. Whether if they be on Foote with great Forces, wee shall Hazarde a Battell with them? And if at all; at what Tyme?

IX. What must be our Stores of Munition, and Magasins of Victuals? And where they are to be kept?

X. What may be added to our former Directions for the disciplining or traininge of those Men? Who shall make the boddye of the Armie, that shall first encounter the Ennemye?

XI. Whether the sayd Numbers that were appointed in 88, to be assembled and to make Head, may not be changed, lessened or increased, by the Dis-

Discretion of him vnto whome her Majestie geues
her Commission?

*The Earle of Essex Answer to his owne
Questione, 6 November, 1596.*

Myne Opinion in the first Question is, That
Questions of this Waight where the misjudging
of the Ennemies Purpose may cause a Want of
necessary Preparations; and our being not prepa-
red, may hazard our whole State: In these I say,
wee should not buyld uppon Probabilities and Pre-
sumptions, but imagining the worst, provide for
it. For though the present Season of the Yeare
may breede Daunger to his Fleet, yet his know-
ing that our Ships are layd up, and cannot soone
be sett out to encounter him: His imbarcking of
his Lande Forces, yea, in such haste as he shipped
them Night and Day: His being already come to
the *Groine* and *Feroll*: Wherewith me thinkes he
should not geve us the Alarum, if he tarye till the
Spring: Do all seeme to perswade he meanes to
come presentlie. But if these Arguments be not
sufficient to proue his coming, yet they are strong
enough to make it be doubted; and as I said be-
fore, in doubtful Cases, let us not be vnprovided.

In the second Question, I am directly and con-
fidently of Opinion, that if the *Spaniarde* come
to us with an Armie, he comes to Invade, and not
to make Incursions.

First, because no Incursions he shall be able to
make, wilbe a sufficient Reuendge for that which
was made uppon him, and the Reuenge is ever
intended greater than the hurte receaued.

Secondly, he finding with what Difficultie he
makes a great Armie by Sea, and with what Losse
he came once uppon our Coaste, will neuer Ha-
zarde the lyke again but for a *Coup de partie*.

Thirdlie, since wee are the more populous Nation, haue the greater Number of Mariners, and may ether of our selves, or by the helpe of our Neighbours of the *Low Countreys*, find Shipping to rune ouer euey Day vnto his Coaste; yea, since so little is to be gotten by them in *England* by any Incurfion, and so much in *Spaine* by us; they will thinke, Incurfions or playing at Base (as I may terme it) to be to their great Disadvantage.

Fourthlie, out of the Tyme of his coming, J may Reason against Incurfion. For if he deferre it tyll the Spring, wee shall be prouided to fight a Battaile with him by Sea, wherein he shall abyde the greatest Hazarde that may be, for hope of the least desseing. If he come presently, J say he darre not in this Season goe burning and spoyling all alongst our Coaste, with his vnnymble, and vnweldie great Ships, no though we should geve him Pasport. For though he might come with good Winde to some certaine Porte with safetie, and lodge there, which will be his Course if he inuade, yet to go alongst our Coaste, and to tary what Windes soeuer come for the landing and receaving backe of his Men, if he had our nymble Ships, and our best Pilotts, he durst not do it in Winter.

In the third; J think wee may easilie preuent all dangerous Incurfions, for on the backsyde of *England*, or towards *St. Georges Channel*, J looke not for them, the Coast being dangerous, out of the Way, and little by an Incurfion to be lost by us, or gotten by them. The lyke J may say for Pouertie of the Coast of *Cornwall*, from the Lands End to *Plymouth*: Only *Plymouth* of the Portes, farr West is to feared. *Dartmouth* may be perhaps of some Consideration; but from thence to the *Ile of Wight*, no Place of great Importance,

tance, for the good Townes are farr into the Land. If that the Iland be attempted, I thinke they mean to keepe it, which is an Invasion and no Incurfion. *Portesmouth* is fortified, so as in that Quarter only *Southampton* is to be feared. From that Quarter Eastward our Channell growes narrowe, and Coast more dangerous: Besides, it is neere *London*, and our greatest Forces. So as if wee see they beginne in the West, and that their Errand is only to burne and spoile, ere they come to the East, wee shal bee provided to entertaine them to their Coste. So as I conclude since the Places where their Incurfions may be dangerous, are fewe, it is easie to strengthen them by Fortifications, or by Forces, so as they may be defended, which I will speake particularlie of in the fifth Question.

In the 4th I thinke he will never seeke to lodge in any Porte farr of, as in our Westerne Portes; for by Land from thence he can neuer force his Passage; and if for a further Attempt uppon us, he should be dryuen again to imbarke his Armie, and to make a new Descent, he were better to be in the Porte of *Brest*, then in any of our Westerne Portes: For he were as good crosse over, as come alongst the Coast, and here he should find vnquiet dwelling, and there were safe. *Plymouth* onlie because it is the Porte, whence wee sett forth our Fleets to the Southwards may be in his Eye, if his disseing by lodging by us, be to weaken us by Degrees, and not attempt us at once. But if he come now this Winter Season without his Galleis (as with them tyll the Spring he cannot come) and attempt any Place before he haue taken in the Armie of the *Low Countries*, I doe fully perswade my selfe, he will fall with the Coast of *Hampshire*, and the *Ile of Wight* is the first Place he will Attempt. *Portesmouth* and
Southampton

Southampton are the Places on the mayne that are ouer against it, and if he come to the first, it is lyke he will see howe the others will defend a Surprinsse. And if he staye all the Springe, wherby he may being his Galleis to Command our Riuer, and be once ioyned with the Armie of the *Lowe Countries*, I thincke he will come to *Scheppe*, and to the Riuer of *Thames*. *Harwich* is a good Hauen for a Fleet to Lodge in, but there are to many Flatts and Sands before it, for the *Spaniard* to come to.

To the 5th I aunswere, That I could wishe *Plymouth* were fortified, because it is one of our richest Porte Townes, and fittest for all Sea Provisions. But nether the Seate of the Towne, nor the Leasure which the Ennenie is lyke to geue us will permit it. For the present it must be made strong by Men, to which End, when we thincke the Ennenie neere coming, there should be a good Force lodged in the Towne, Forte, and Iland, and some sufficient Captens entertayned there at her Magisties Charge. *Southampton* is a differing Seate, for it is strong by Nature, and if it were once possessed by an Ennenie, it would be hardly recovered. Two or three Raelings of Earthe which are quicklie made, and with little Charge would make the Towne tenable, tyll an Armie came to succour it, though it tooke twentie Daies Leasure in coming. *Portsmouth* is our only Place fortified in these Quarters, but if it be not garded with a better Garrison, it will be in as much Danger as any Place els. If besids the Places mentioned there were a great Forte made in the *Ile of Wight* ouer against *Hurst Castle*, which might receaue Succours from the mayne, I thincke wee should neede to fortifie no were elce.

VI. To the 6th I annswere, that wee are in no sorte to meddle with his Trenches or to force his

his Quarter, but to lodge in Strenght by him, wherby we may cutt of his Men, that would goe a spoiling into the Lande : As of the other syde our Ships should cutt of all his Victualls and Supplies by Sea, so forcing him to spend of the Store he brought, wee shall make him starue or returne.

VII. To the 7th J say, we are to impeach him by one of those three Ways : By leauing him nothingh to releefe him selfe in his marche, but what he hath upon his Carriages : By forcing him to marche slowelie, wherby he shall spende such Victualls as he hath upon his Carriages ; and by making euerie Place that either is of it selfe, or may be made of Advantage to us, as deare to him as wee can ; for so wee shall both wyne Tyme, and wast his Numbers, which are in this Case two infinite Advantages. If it be doubted that wee can not force him to marche slowlie in an open Countrey, J answere, that if wee do confronte him with equall Numbers, and farr over toppe him with Horse, wee may if wee be well conducted, forced him almost euery Day to stand in Battail without ingaging our selues to fight, and to let him goe forwarde no faster than a Shayle.

VIII. To the 8th my Opinion is, That since by beating the *Spaniards* here, wee can gett but their Clothes, and their Skinnes, and by being beaten wee venture to loose all : That we should auoide Battail as much as wee can, wee should be euer fighting in little Troupes to fleshe and inure our Countymen, but neuer in great, for to defeat an Ennemie without fighting in the Praise of our Conduct, the other is to be adscribed only to our good Happ : But if wee should fight at any Tyme in grosse, it should be vppon great and euident Advantage ; and when by refusing to fight the Ennemie might possesse some Place which would
be

be greatly to our Preiudice; but from this J thinck wee may keepe our selues, if wee use Speed in preparing, and good Conduct in executing.

IX. Our Stoare of Munition J thincke should be great, as of Powder 400 or 500, lastes at least, of matche and lead to Supplie many Armies, of Armes sufficient in her Magisties Stoare for one entire Armie of 20000 Foote and 5000 Horse, of Toolles for Pioners 20000, of all Kind of Necessaries for the Artillerie, and for the Use of it, enough to serve two seuerall Armies, allowing twentie Peeces of Artillerie to an Armie. Of all these J would have one half at *London*, the rest at *Ex-ceter*, *Portesmouth*, and *Southampton*. Also at these fower Places J would have our Magasins of Victualls, which should be as great as can be provided in this suddain surprise and Scarcetie. J forbear to sett downe a certayne Quantitie, because J know wee can not provide so much as were fitt.

X. For our trayning and disciplining our Men, J thincke all they that are intended to be of one Bodye should have one and the same disciplining and trayning, and that to be sett downe by the cheef Commanders and Officers of that Armie, for elce there will growe infinite Trouble to the Commander, and Confusion in the Service.

XI. In the laste Question my Opinion is, That it should be leaft some what to the Commander of the Armie, whether he will keepe the same iuste Musters allotted him, or alter them vppon Occasion. For those may come to him vnarmed, or ill armed, that are certified to be well furnished, and sometymes greater, and some tymes fewer Numbers will be requisite.

*The Opinion of William Lord Burghley, Lord
High Thresorer of England, uppon those Ar-
ticles and Answers of the said Earle.*

I. **F**IRST, J do concurre with the Earle in his Annswere to the firste Question, to haue all Preparations made readie to withstand the Attempt of the Ennemy, though the same be not certainly knowen, but vppon Presumptions to be greatly doubted; so as Suretie to be perferred before Charge: That the olde Word of *baud putarem* may not haue Place.

II. To the seconde, Though J am not fully perswaded that this Armie reported, is either meant, or able in this Time of the Yeare to make an Invasion to possesse the Realme, but rather to make some Incursion for reuenge of the Attempt at *Cales*, where there followed no Possession of his Countrie, but by Way of Incursion. Yet J thinck, that no Preparation ought to be omitted, that might assure the Realme against his Invasion: Considering whatsoeuer may be made able to withstand Inuasion will certainly withstand any Incursion; wherevnto J do not thincke that any Part of the Realme will be found vnwilling for their owne Defence: And to all the Arguments made, being in Number fower, prouing the Intent of the Ennemie to be rather for an Invasion then an Incursion, J thincke the same very probably collected against the which J neede make no Argument, considering my Opinion is that the Preparations to be made against the Ennemie are requisite, either for Inuasion or Incursion.

III. To the 3d, J do agree with the Opinion, That the Places named be most necessary to be putt in Defence, according to the Opinion expressed in the third Article: And therfore, besydes the further proceeding in the fortifying of the new Forte

at *Plymouth*, and the Iland of *St. Nicholas*, I thincke it necessarie, that certaine Bandes of Foote-men were putt in Readines for the garding of the Towne of *Plymouth*, and for the barrocading of it in Places needfull to withstand the suddaine Entrie of the Ennemy into the same: The lyke Care would be had of the new Forte, and the Iland of *St. Nicholas*. As for *Falmouth*, although I thincke the Hauen may be taken by the Ennemie, notwithstanding the two Fortes there; yet I thinke convenient that both the Captens of the Fortes, if they shal finde themselues vnable to withstand the Entrie of the Ennemy, do withdrawe the Ordynance into the Lande, and that notwithstanding the same, conuenient Forces be brought by Lande, to ether Syde of the River to withstand or impeache the Landing, and all Things withdrawn from the Coaste there, that might in any wise pleasure the Enemy. The lyke Care I wishe to be taken for the Porte of *Dartmouth*, by Forces to be brought thether, ether to withstand his Landing, or not to suffer him to proceede into the Land. For *Portsmouth*, I hope ther is by former Order and presentlie to be executed, sufficient Numbers appointed to enter into the Towne, and Ile, for Defence thereof. Lykewise I thincke the Forces of the *Iland of Wight*, being well trayned and furnished for their Defence, with the Ayde and Supply of 900 Men presentlie appointed thether, will stay the Iland from Possession of the Ennemie, as was well proued in the last Yeare of King *Henry the Eight*, when the whole Nauy of the *Frenche* were at *St. Hellens Point*, and their Forces by Land had entred into the Iland, being well repulsed with the Forces of the Ile, without any further Ayde, sauing only two Bandes, whereof one was vnder *St. Francis Knollis*, and the other vnder *Sir Richard Blunt*, since which Tyme
the

the People of the Ilande haue been putt into Forces and Bandes, and well trayned, as any have been, as by the Experience was proued in the Northren Rebellion, when Sir *Edward Horsey* had the leading of those Companies. Concerning the strenghtning of *Southampton*, although I thinke it vnlikelie that the Ennemie shall Attempt to possesse that Towne, except he shall first possesse the *Ile of Wight*, and *Portesmouth* also; yet considering the making of some Sconce or Raelings of Yearth might make it tenable for a Tyme, I thinke it verie good that the same be considered, and putt in Execution.

IV. and V. To the 4th and 5th I do thinke the Ennemie will rather Attempt the Coast of *Hampshire*, and the *Ile of Wight*; therefore both the *Ile* and *Portesmouth* are to be presentlie garded. And where mention is made, to haue some Forte made in the *Ile of Wight* ouer against *Hurst*, from whence Succours might be sent from the mayne Land into the *Ile of Wight*: As I remember there is a Place that hath ben for that Purpose fortified in former Tyme, called *Sharpwood*, which would be presently repayred for that Purpose. And lykewise the olde Forte of *Yarmouth*, may serve for that Purpose to Succour the Landing of Men out of the mayne Land of *England*, whereof the Captain of the *Ile of Wight* should be presentlie warned.

VI. To the 6th I thinke the Opinion to be verie good only to lodge in Strenghts by him, and thereby to wearie him: For that the longer he be kept from proceeding into the Lande, the weaker he shal growe by waste of his Victuails, and decay of his Men, and on the contrarie Part wee shal increase in Strenght against him.

VII. To the 7th I thinke the Opinion verie good, by forcing the Ennemie to marche slowlie,

and thereby to spend his Victuails, and to make every Place difficult for him to passe. And J agree also that the ouer matching him with Numbers of Horses, he may be stayed from enteringe farre into the Land, in Places where Horsemen may be used : And in other Places of Straight and Enclosures many Impediments may be geuen vnto him, to stay him from any farr Entrie into the Land.

VIII. To the 8th J do allowe of the Opinion, That the Ennemie should be only skirmished withall with sondry Troopes, both by Day and Night, but not to fight with him in grosse openlie without great Aduantag.

IX. As to the Opinion of Stoare of Munition and Armes, for so many Footemen and Horsemen, as are therein spoken of, and for Toolles for the Pioners, for so many as are also spoken of, J wishe such Prouision might be made, but the Charges exceeds my Understanding. And for the Matter of Armes, J do thincke the Multitude of People, already trayned sufficient to make the Armies necessarye, are already prouided of Armor and Weapons, in euerye Countrey, at the Charge of the Countries ; although J thincke it requisite to have some reasonable Portions of her Majesties Prouision to supply the Defects. But J am of Opinion that such Munition as shal be prouided at her Majesties Charges, may be diuided as is contained in the Answer. Where of the one halfe to be at *London*, the rest at *Douer* for *Kent*, at *Exceter*, *Portsmouth*, and *Southampton*, where also it were requisite to have some Staple of Victuails to be prouided.

X. J am also of Opinion, That the trayning and disciplining of all the Men that are to serue to compounde the Armye, should haue one Manner of training and discipline, which J thincke might be most conuenientlie done, by Instructions to be
geuen

geven to such as should be presently sent downe to euerie Countie to viewe the State and Condition of the Forces: For which Purpose choise would be made of some one or two to be sent into everie County well instructed for that Purpose.

XI. To the last Question, I thincke it most necessarye, that for the Composition of the Armies, the collection of the Numbers, and of their Conditions in their Nombers and Qualities, should be ordered by the Direction of the General Lieutenant, or such Officers of the Fielde, as should be appointed under him.

*The Opinion of Peregrin Lord Willoughbie,
concerning the same Articles.*

I. **T**O the first; If the Ennemie were ready with his Shipping neere *Ferroll* or the *Groine* the 18th of *October*, they intending a Voyage for *England*; would haue been discouered vppon our Coast before this 13th of *Nouember* after their styll. But it is to be feared, least they passe the Ocean on the Backesyde of *Ireland* and *Scotland*. It is to be juged therefore they will rather respect at this Tyme of the Yeare especially the Oportunitie of fitt landing Places, and Complices, then our narrow Seas and Shelues deathful in long Winter and tempestuous Nights. It may be by Practize of *James Stewarde* Earle of *Errall* come lately of *Spayne*, and others, labouring to insinuate themselves into the King's Fauour, Emotions may be in *Scotland*, therefore it and *Ireland* are not the least to be thought vppon for the present Enterprife. But no doubt this Proiect is in fitt Seafone, and gayned Oportunitie to prosecute further Invasiō.

II. As is aforesaid, there is no great Appa-
rance of present Invasiō, if they holde the great
Ocean

Ocean Course; if with Incursions, they would do any thing (for many Reasons too tedious to wrytt) the Towne and Harbour of *Flissinge*, and the Isles of *Walcherland* may be feared, which I knowe some will holde rydiculous, tyll they apprehend the Means, the Mischiefe may light be.

III. To prevent Incursions, two Resistances are to be made, th'one by Sea, the other by Land. The first if the Preparations be proportionable, are lyke to beat them, at least ours to retyre orderlie Home, and bring us worde of Blowes, and geue us Tyme to be readie and in Armes. The second is for Lande Preparations; If Countrie Preparations be in Numbers, Armes, and trayning so perfect and faire as is deliuered in good Bookes, there wants no more but sounde practised Harquebushers on Horsebacke, that may with Speede repaire from Contry to Contry to seconde where Danger is emynent. The manner of the Fighting, and Marshalling such would be directed by a Man of some Judgment which conceiueth the true Use of them in such Services.

IV. If Inuasion: The *Thames*; The right Way to *Rochester* and *Gellingham*, and so then forward to *London*, and to the fairest Marcke without Delayes, or longe Marches to spoyle and waste their Men.

V. It is necessary not only to fortifie with Flanckes, and Curtens, but with Caglioni, as the *Italians* do terme them, which would be Numbers of the best and stoutest Men, and in such Places as haue bene more largelie Written, Magasins of all Necessaries might be made to supply all Wants, from thence Troupes alwaies might be marching and shifted, and on Convoyes as well to enable them in Soldierlie Exercises, to cleare the Wayes, and to hinder the Ennemies Forages.

If

If the Ennemie came in grosse, they might recover some fortified Towne, or other before they should light of them: By such Means, good Intelligences might be gathered, and many Practises disappointed. In Fortification it would be considered, what he is that should keepe them, for if they be newe to be made, it is great Advantage to him to use his owne Skyll, for it is necessary such a Personne should not be Ignorant; yf it be fortified unto him, he had neede busye his Head to find his Ende that did it. Count *Sauanarola* an excellent Ingenor fortifying in *Hungarie*, the Place after was putt in an others Hands, who not well understanding his Desseigne most vnhuckelye lost his strenght to the *Turke*.

Fortified Places require Men experienced therein to keep them as well, as to make them, els they are dangerous.

VI. The Grounds adjoyning to suches Portes are to be considered, and accordinglie Advantages taken, whereuppon there would be Platformes rayfed, and Peeces mounted of Nature according to the Distance if it be to shoot against Shipping farr of, Culvering, Demyculuering and Mynion is very good, if they haue it neere Hand, or that they haue rayfed Grounde or intrenched, the Cannon incamerato battereth more, and consumeth lesse Powder. To remoue them also, there may be sondry Sorts of Fiers deuysed, as well by burning of old Shippes as was in the Yeare 88, as by artificiall Fyre to burne in Water: Or by Engines prepared purposely for such a Desseigne, which shall secure that strenght much, that shall otherwise attempt them.

VII. This is answered in the third and fyuth Articles.

VIII. Before

VIII. Before we come to hazarde a Battayll, many Things are to be considered, our Men to be well practised, and well prouided of all Things to haue gotten Aduantages in some other Attempts and Encounters to be incorage, the Ennemie weackned by all the Means that can be, which is by Want, by Weather, by former Blowes, *ect.* excellent well chofen Cannoniers should for such a Day be gotten. It is trewe if wee beate him, wee make short Worcke, but if wee loose, wee are not so happie as wee tooke our selves for. Our Seconds wyll not peradventure be so forward, when the Flower of our Armie, which doubtles would beare the Brunt, should be beaten, it would be an excuse for colder Blood to be beaten also. Seconde Retrayts in Fortifications be for the most Parts yelded, and second Battails where the first be ruyned hardly succeed well. I meane not by the Name of a Battaille, euery great Encounter (as some peradventure would take me short) but as it is defined by cheefs of Warre.

IX. and X. Better Practise to your Discipline and Trayning, more wast Powder allowed to make Shott withal, since that is the Weapon, wee are onlie inferior in. The Bodies of your Armies are assembled by your Lieutenants of your Countrie, but properlie commanded by your high Generall, or such inferior Generalls, Presidents, cheefe Marshalls, or other Person qualified as by her Majestie and your Lordships shal be thought on, for the Sufficiency and other Reasonnes to increase no Charge with many great Officers, as shall fytt the rest is aunswered, *ut supra.*

XI. It is most necessarye, That he who commandeth the greatest Charge, and Wealth of a Crowne and Contrie, the Harts and Hands of so many valorous Subiects, should commande the lesse, that is, the Nombers, the Diuision of the Armies,

Armies, their Rende'vouz and Assemblies, and all other Prouision of Munytion, Carriages, Victuails, *ect.* by his vnder Officers fytt to nourishe such an Armie, as should fight for such a Queene, and such a Cause.

The Opinion of Thomas Lord Burrough concerning the same Articles.

I. **T**O the first! Since it seems by the Aduertisements from those Parties that many Shippes of the King of Spaines, are armed, a Commander of speciall Note authorized; with whom it must in Congruitie holde, such a Bodye of Forces must be disposed, as may confort vnto the Qualitie of so great a Personne, and that all be descended from the Trade of the Southern Courses, and that in these Parts of Christendome, his Malice is not against any, as against this Kingdome manifested, nether that any other Argument may be geuen, of so mightie Preparation. My Opinion is, the Journey is intended hether, and that since these be assembled, they will nether consume their Prouisions in Idleness, nor dissolue without Attempt speedilye.

II. To the seconde, To dispute it is more curious, but lesse safe; Foresee that the greatest ille be repelled, and in the same Counsaills the lesse will not be leaste at large. And I take those Reasonnes whereof some lay holde to be secure of an Invasion, rather to be Inducements to the Hopes of an Ennemies Desseigne. The Season: Therefor lesse looked for; and lesse by our Shipping to be impeached, which are at this Tyme of the Yeare commonlie out of Trymme. Dearth: the Inuadours Advantage: He comes furnished: And lesse are wee able to keepe many Mouths together, and to furnishe and reduce all our Marketts to

Place. The neernesse of the *Low Countries* Armie, freshe to Victories, and accommodated with Hauens : The Portes and principall Citie after which the Scope of their Mischeefe may seeme most to ayme, and to accelerate a Victorye, geue them by the Neighbourhood a ready Incouragement, as in all assaylours Proiects they apprehend that to be almost done, which is not farre from vnder-taking. J further thincke so much more an Inuasion to be purposed, as lesse J see lykelihood that so great a Nauy shoulde be sett forthe to an Incursion. For J take it fewe Coast-Townes in *Englande* are defensible against two hundred Soldiers sodenly arriuing : And since there needes no Siege to possesse, sacke, and burne any of them, J should iudge the Counsell of *Spaine* would apply that which were competent to the Busynes, and of lesse wonder : Which might be the worke of 10 Ships, and J beleue they be out of doubt in such an affright the Contry would scarfe gather, but that they might promise themselves a Retrayte, especiallye it being rare, and of those Tymes they may have Intelligence, or confident Presumption, when they should have Cause to feare the readiness of any lyke Number of our Shipping to encounter them. But howsoeuer the one, or the other is in Trymme with them, J thincke wee owe to our Queene and Contry the Care against the worst they may pretend. And where some may inferre, that the Defence maybe made with more ease against Incursion then an Inuasion, and unnecessarye to labour in the more, when in the lesse the Prouision is made ; J holde it (though to common vnderstanding it may so appeare, because the one is as they will suppose to be resisted with fewe Frontiers, and the other to Charge the whole Lande ; yet in the Disposition of those who looke further, howe an Order may be directed, and maid facile by well applying

appling it, as breefie in vnderstanding the Strenght of the Contreis, the aptnes of eche to second others, the constituting of diuers inferior and experienced Soldiers to be assisting to the Gentlemen of the Shires, Places of Rendez vous to be prescribed, and a Forme of aunswering all Allarums well digested, according to the seuerall Quarters, when they must arme, and Intelligence held betweene one and an other, which way to bend, and Discouersers to be sent of Light Horse, or such lyke, that Confusion doe not surpise the better Judgements) It will be found of little more Difficultie, and of much more Suretie, to imagine what Mischief they would may be possible, and to confront them with such Diligence, wher by they may be defeated with Impossibility,

III. To the third. If any of the best Hauens be gardable, it must be by Fortification, or with Strenght of Men: Those fortified haue Garrison as J conceive: They may easilie be free from Surprise which is the Effect of Jncursion: Others, which are tenable meerly by Hands, J thinck must be subiect to this Hazarde; for to place Gardes in all such dangerous Accesses, as be dangerous, were an insupportable Expence, except to some select Harborough, an extraordinarye Prouision be founde requisite: Otherwise all that the Condition of this Land will permitt, is to geue Hinderance to a farre Entrie, which may be preuented by such Course, as in the Ende of the precedent Aunswere to the second Question is touched; and to indure that some must suffer in the Plague of Warres.

IV. To the fourth, J am of Opinion if he invade he will use the Portes nereest the *Thames*, by which he will make his Descent: For touching others farre of J could not thincke he should serue himselfe; to passe cleare through the Lande, is a Worcke to ruyne an Armie with out striking one

Blowe : To use any Port and fortifie it, to make a Magasine, is absurd when he passeth forwards : For after he is marched any Distance to helpe himselfe therby, must be by Conuoy, and to strenghten it so, as it will not be cutt of, must weaken his Camp so, as the one or other wilbe lesse able to withstand a Fight, where a Realme is in Armes watching Oportunitie : To keepe any of them, is to subiect the Throates of them, who are so confined to the Mercy of so many Casualties, as the least of any of them succeeding, there can be no Escape : Many Inpediments of Winds, may come between them and their Succours, and if they come with a mayne Fleet, yet is there Probabilitie, wee should our selves and Allyes be much their Superiours before a second Descent. Therefore J coniecture towards this Southern Coast, where there is in the Eye, the butt they shoot at, and hope for spedie Tryall, and most proper for the Cardinals Armie, they haue addressed this Enterprise.

V. To the 5th, The Consideration thereof must depend on the Seat of the Places, and Entrie of the Channell, by which if a Nauy cannot ryde, and lanche out Boates to Land Men, but in the Danger of the Porte Townes, then is it necessary and possitable to fortifie, els it is Booteles where other Libertie of the Shoare is geuen to arryue.

VI. To the 6, It is hard to prescribe in Matter of Execution any Rule what is to be done, when the Practise on your Parte must haue Relation to that which your Ennemie occasioneth you to vndertake. In which Courses most is in the Instant to be referred to the general Commanders Watchfulness and Direction in apprehending euery Commodity.

VII. To the 7th, He must be incommoded in the Conuoye of his Munition and victuail by our
Light

Light Horſe, who ſhall haue this Benefitt to knowe all Paſſages, and great Care would be applied to keepe him Guideles, and in the Circuites whether he makes Head all wilbe ruyned, and made deſert by ours.

VIII. To the 8th, There is nothing that the Invadours may ſeeke then to ioyne readilie, and without his Raiſhnes geue us Cauſe to take him at his Worde, or that wee may finde his Forces be harraſſed and weackned by the Journey, J hold it Pollicie to lett him coole the warmeth of his Fury, and geue himſelf and his Troupes ſatietie in ſuch Incombrances as will followe any Armye which affayles in a ſtrong Contrie. Differe Battail J would on theſe Aduantages. J would wayte on him, and viewe him from his firſt ſetting downe, on Paſſages J would ſkirmiſhe with him therby to inure ours to Blowes, and J would thincke no meeting ſhould be without conſuming ſome of his, and many muſt weaken him who cannot haue Supplies at Hand, and ours neede neuer want reſreſhing J would amaſe him in hauing ſundry Armies on Foote, for hardly belieue J he could know which Way to turne him, when diuerſe Bodies not inferior in Number to his, ded accoaſte him; and where he would force to be charged in Front, Flanke and Rerewards. Theſe be Motiues to perſuade me, that it is beſt deferre Battaille, but in Matters of Action there may come betweene many Occaſions of Alterations: The Foreſight whereof is proper to the Generall.

IX. To the 9th, J have ſeene for the Seige of two or three Townes, and a Sommers Seruice in Field a Prouiſion made of 150 Laſts of Powder, and an agreeable Rate of Matche, Bullets, and all Sorts of Munition. In the Queſtion therefore of Stoare for a Kingdome, J can eſtimate no leſſe to be

be covenient, then double so much at the least, and to be disposed in 4 or 5 Cities in the Realme, there to be distributed as Cause requires, and in *London* J would wishe as much as in all the rest.

X. To the 10th, It were good to conceaue the former Directions well, but because J am ignorant of the Particulars knowe not what are to be added or altered.

XI. To the 11th, J know not what Numbers were in eightie eight, but when there is a Forme of Armie described, J thincke so much is to be reposed in the Generall sent to take charge for her Majestie, as to order the Troupes in Number more or less as he findes requisite.

The Opinion of Roger Lord Northe uppon the same Articles.

Admitting the Intelligence to be true,

I. **I**T is lyke the Ennemie will delay no Tyme in comming; for the dishonor and losse he receaued at *Cales*, doth kyndle his Malice, and so great Furye, that he burneth in desire, vntill he be reuenged; the Hope thereof will bringe him rather nowe, then in the Spring: Partly for that his Preparations be great and ready, specially for that he thinketh to finde vs vnprepared now. For tarying till the next Spring, wee shal be in more readynesse to withstand him, being thus forewarned by the Bruite of his Preparations.

II. I thincke no Invasion, but Incursion; for that the Season of the Yeare serueth not, as also that 10000 Soldiers are not sufficient to make Invasion, or to marche farre into the Lande: It is not lyke he should bring many more Soldiers, not hauing aboue.80 Saile of Shippes as it is sayd, for the

the two * Generals were furnished with 150 Sayles, and all the Forces they transported was vnder 6000 Soldiers.

III. Though it be vnpossible to provide against all the landing Places of *England*, yet there must be such Fortifications made as the Tyme will geue Leave in the most needfull Places, and such Porte Townes as be vnwalled must be renforced with Men. The Incursion will be of more Loss to the particular Subject than of danger to the Realme; for his landing will be suddain and uncertaine, and prosecuted with Furie in somme small Circuite, and so from Place to Place the Forces of the Sea-Coast must uppon euery suddaine, be readie to impeach his Landing, and what in them lyeth, to stoppe his further Martche vntill greater Forces come, prouyde that the Contrie leave to the Ennemy as little Spoile of Victual, Corn, Cattel, and Goods as can be conuayed or caryed away.

IV. Jf Inuasion or Incursion, the Places of most Danger to hurt the Realme, and to doe him good, are the *Ile of Wight* and *Southampton*, hauing the one, he may daylie receaue Shipping to him with Men and Victuall, with the other he may at all Tymes marche into the mayne, and harte of the Lande, and greatly annoy the same.

V. There woulde some Fortification be made at *Southampton*, of good Importance, so lykewise at the *Wight* ouer against *Hurst* Castle, which is by the *Needles*.

VI. Jf he be planted in any firme Lande, then according to the Place, he is ether to be blocked up with Sconces, or els fronted with a great Armie neere vnto him, which may continually impeach him, and attend his Purposes. Jf he should attempte an Jlande, let all Expedition be used
and

* Erle of *Essex* : Lord Admiral.

and great Forces sent thether to hinder his Landing; if landed, to displant him, if it may be, at the least to geue litle rest tyll greater Forces come.

VII. Answered in the 6th Article.

VIII. He must be encountered with a greater Armie, to amase and wyne Tyme of him, for Tyme will weare, and weary him, and our strengt will increase. To sett downe Opinion, whether wee shal forbear to Fight or geue Battail, cannot now be resolued, but must be taken or refused as occasion shal be presented: Howbeit J wishe no Battail to be fought, if with Honor it may be refused, cheeflie where the Losse is Apparent to be much greater then the Honor of the Victory.

IX. J wishe to haue no lesse than 400 Lasts of Powder, and great Stoare of Victuail, lett *Southampton* be for the *Wight*, and all *Hamshire*. Some Towne in the West for *Deuon*, *Cornwall*, and *Portland* for *Norfolck* and *Suffolck*, *Lynne* or *Ipswich*, and *London* for *Kent*, *Sussex* and *Essex*.

X. Lett all manner of Discipline that is in Practice be added to those Directions, which may enable the Armie with Skyll to meet the Ennemy, who shal first encounter him as the cheef Commander shal direct.

XI. No doubt it will be most conuenient, that the Directions and Conclusions of 88 may be reviewed, and what shal be found to be good, may stande, as also there may be added or pulled from it, what is needfull or superfluous, which must be leaste to the Direction of the General.

The

The Opinion of Sir William Knollys Comptroller of her Majesties Houſholde, concerning the ſame Articles.

I. II. **T**O the two firſt Questions my Answer is a Subscription to my Lo. of *Essex* Answers, and not to yeld further Reasonnes, the rather because they be Matters disputable, and may spend much Tyme, and if our Aduertisements be treu, it is more then Tyme our Consultations were putt in Practice, thincking it better for us to prepare six Moneths to soone than a Day to late.

III. To the third, J take it out of Question, that our Shipping and Sea Service is our best and safest Defence, as being the only Fortification and Rampart of *Englande*, and therefore wishe that all possible speed may be used in setting to Sea as many of them as the Tyme will permit; but if the suddaine coming of the Ennemie take from us this Benefitt, then J thincke it necessary, that uppon firing of the Beacons a Place of Assemblie be appointed, whereunto the Contrie Forces may resort, which Places should not be lesse Distant from the Sea, then six or seuen Myles; because by that Means, you may haue Tyme to putt your Men in order, and consult what is best to be done: Yet do J wishe that by all possible Meanes wee may geue the Ennemie continual Alarums, both at his landing and afterwards, with Horsemen in the Playnes, to the intent they straggle not, and some Numbers of Shott on Horsebacke, at everie Straight, and place of Advantage to winne Tyme, whiles our greater Forces may be putt in better order to defend.

IV. To the fowerth, my Opinion is, That because methincks, the *Spanish* King will not ingage his Fleet to farre within the Sleeue, vntill he haue possessed some good Harbour, of which *Plymouth* is the neereft to *Spayne*, easie to be wonne, speedilie to be fortified, and a Place convenient to send Succour to ether from *Spaine* or *France*, he should attempt the same, and fortifie, if he finde any Place tenable there. Besides, that Place being the Harbour, whence all our Shipping goe that offend him, either in *Spaine*, or in his *Indias*, it is lykelie he will take from us if he may, that Means of annoyng him hereafter: Yet that Place being so farre from the Hart, I iudge his Purpose to settle his Armie, wilbe rather in the *Ile of Wight*, if he can winne it: Both because not being uppon the mayne Land, they may the more easlye defend it, and haue the longer Tyme to fortifie themselues, as also for that they may be releued with Men or Victualls from *Callais*, or any Porte of theirs in *Flandres*, *France*, or *Brytanny*: Especially in the Winter, when our great Shippes dare not keepe the narrowe Seas, and last becaule not being farre from the Mayne, they may make Incursions, burning and spoiling the Contrie adjoyning, if ether a continuall Fleet be not kept at Sea, or an Armie in the Fielde.

V. To the fifth I answer, That the Tyme of the Ennemies approach being lykelie to be suddaine, our best Fortification must be Men, and store of Pyoners, which uppon euerie Occasion may do great Seruice, but if Tyme will permitt, I thincke *Plymouth*, some Place in the *Ile of Wight*, *Southampton*, *Deuer*, *Rye*, and some Places on the Ryuer of *Thames* to be the fyttest to be fortified.

VI. To the 6th I say, That wee must lodge as neere him, as safelie wee may, and by that Means

Means stopping him from ranging abroad, and getting of freshe Victuails, wee shall annoy him more, then by attempting him, and with least losse to our selues, making Preparation with all speed possible to sett as many Shipps to the Sea as may be.

VII. To the 7th, J must say as to the thirde, That an Armie must be compounded to fronte him in those Parts where he Landeth, yet so as with Horsemen wee keep them from stragling farre for Forrage, and by intrenching many Places of Advantage, one behinde an other, where he shall passe, wee may encounter him, and stopp him for a Tyme, though in the ende, wee be dryuen to a retraytte; yet must wee hereby winne Tyme, and the Ennemy receaue losse.

VIII. To the 8th, J say, that J thincke it fytt not to hazard a Battayle, being a tryall dangerous and desperate, It is a way which an Invadour hath reason to seeke, and a Defendour to shunne, for the Invadour by hazarding only his Men, may winne a Kingdome: The Defendor (especiallly in *England*, where wee haue no Townes or Places fortified to retyre vnto) in loosing a Battail aduventureth his Crown: Wherefor I wishe that Tryall to be our last Refuge, and then so to be provided, as in Number wee may exceed them, in order not come behinde them, and fight uppon Places of Advantage.

IX. To the 9th, J answere that J wishe that in a Tyme thus threatned by so mightie an Ennemie, wee should not be sparing of Munition, or Magasins of Victuails, considering that Men without Means, are able to make no Resistance, yet do J thinck fytt, that the cheef Stoare be alwayes kept in the Hart, and that so much may be disperfed into the best Townes, in the fower Quarters of the Realme, as will serue the Forces which are to

answere any suddaine Attempt, leauing the nominating of the Places to better Judgements.

X. To the 10th, J will not take upon me to add any thinge to the former Directions for trayning and disciplining of Men, because they be such as haue ben agreed on by the best Men of Understanding, both in Matters Politike and Martiall: Only I wishe Execution of those Orders, and leaue both the Leading, and Manner of directing them to the Discretion of him that shall commande them. Moreouer J coulde desire, that as there is alreadye order for the arming of her Majesties good Subjects, and disarming of those that be ill affected; so J thinck it fytt, that order should be taken in euerye Shire, that if the Ennemie once Lande, some sufficient Gentleman be appointed as Marshiall, and that he accompanied with some other, may haue Authoritie to execute Marshiall Lawe upon all ill-affected Personnes, as Rogues, masterles Men, or knowen Papist, that shall assemble ether to assist the Ennemie, or spoile the Countrie, and those to be seuerely executed.

XI. To the last, I say, That J do not take the order in 88 to be sett downe for so certaine a Rule, as it may not by Discretion of the Generall, and uppon occasion be altered, but what therein was good to be followed, and any thinge to be added that may better the Service: And to the Ende the order in 88, and whatsoeuer may be or shall be added thereto may be the better putt in Execution, J thincke it necessarie, that an uniforme Order in Martiall Causes be observed throughout *England*, knowing that Disorder breedeth Confusion, and Confusion bringth Ruine. For establishing whereof her Majestie may be pleased to settle an Authoritie in some such, whose Valour, Vertue, and Judgment may make him worthie of so great a Chardge, and whose Religious

gious Loue to her Majestie, and true Zeale to his Countrie, may deserue so great a Trust: For diuersitie of Opinions breeds many Doubts and Doubts bring forth Irresolutions, and therby Delays, then which (especially in the Warres) there is nothing more dangerous. This Authoritie being once settled, J allowe that the Course taken in 88, be put in Practice, J meane that fower Armies be proportioned in the fower Quarters of this Lande, eache of them having a Place of Rendezvous, hauing lykewise Colonells, Captens and other Officers for the Warres to guide their Companies, being well furnished with Armor and Weapon, in orderlie Manner to the Places appointed, and fearing least the Countrie Colonells and Captens be not of Knowledge sufficient to discharge this Seruice: J could wishe that some speciall Men be sent to euerie Armie, as Assistants to them. And that some one Lieutenant of the Shire, where the Armie is, or some other fyttter for the Place may commande in Cheef vnder the Authoritie and by Direction from the Generall. That Munition and a Magasine of Victuails may be provided to be in some Towne nere to the Place of the Assemblie, and fytttest for that Purpose. Lastly, wheresoeuer the Ennemie shall Lande, J thincke it a necessarie Policye with Diligence to drawe all Victuails, Cattell, Carriages and Corne behinde our Backs; and that which cannot be carryed rather to consume, then that the Ennemye should possesse it, for nothing can Plague them more then ether Want of Carriages or Victuails. These Things being thus ordered, J doubt not but the Generall, accompanied with Men able to resist, instructed with Knowledge how to use them, and fortified with good Order, shall be able with God's Assistance to repell the Ennemye.

*The Opinion of Sir Walter Raleigh uppon the
same Articles.*

Jf wee consider without further Circumstances that the Fleet which was at *Lisbone*, is alreadie come to the *Groine*, and hath doubled *Cape finis terræ*, wee may then with good Reason conceaue that they purpose to be on our Coast forthwith. But there are three Reasons that may againe holde us in doubt that they will not sett out tyll the Spring or Sommer.

First, It is verye certaine that there is great scarcitie of Victuail in *Lisbone*, and therfore the Armie not being able to be sustayned there, the same is drawn into *Biskay* where is greater Plaintie of all Things.

Secondly, Because there is a better out lett from the *Groyne* then from the River of *Lisbone*, for the Winds take them short within the *Bay*; if they fall not againe directlie with the Mouth of *Lisbone*, they shalbe in Danger of Shipwracke, that may be the second Cause of their coming thether.

The third Reason is, That it seemeth by the Intelligence, that they expect Ships out of the *Straights*, from *Andeluzia*, and now therfore the *Groine* being found fyttter both for Foode and Outlett, their coming thether doth not so certainlie proue any suddaine Approach: Which together with the Expectation of Forces farr of, doth promise and assure us a longer Tyme to prepare for Defence, and that these Necessities haue drawn them thether, rather then that they are so farr on ward in their Way.

Whether they intende Invasiõ or Incursion, I will not presume to iudge. I haue not known or read, that any Prince hath invaded without these two, able Power, and Partye. Howe the *Spanish*
King

King can gather such an Armie and Fleet together in so short Tyme, considering his late Losses, I conceaue not. He was three Years in the Preparation for *Portugall*; and yet had a strong Partie and entered vppon the same Continent. The Enterprise of 88 required no lesse Tyme, the Garrisons of *Naples*; and *Milane* were then drawen downe, which wee heare not of at this Tyme. On the other side, It is unlykelie that the *Spanish* King will yndertake any smal Affaire, and it is safe to provide for the worste. But if I wee shal beleue it to be an Invasiõ, I am of Opinion, that it will be late in the Sommer, ere the same be attempted: And the Enterprise will be by this Observations made most manifest: If the Armie of the *Low Countreys* shal be used upon any Part of *France*, or the *Low Countreys*, wherby it may be wasted or receaue Losse. I do then vnder Correction assure my selfe that there will be no Invasiõ: If the saue rest, and holde it selfe in Strenght, and withall drawe down toward the Sea side, the Invasiõ may be then verie much doubted.

III. To the third Article: I thincke it is impossible to provide safelie for an Incurfion, because the Purpose and Counsell of the Ennemie is unknown. There is Order alreadie for interchangeable Succour betweene the Lieutenants: It were withall in myne Opinion verie requisite that there be Viewe taken howe the Forts uppon the Coaste be provided of Munitions, and that the Captens of the same be not only commanded to repaire vnto them, but charged to keepe their full Numbers, and that those Companies appointed to Succour the Forts, be directed to come vnto them armed, where as nowe they make repaire without Weapon. And if there were a sufficient Fleete of Ships to lay in the Entrance of the Channell, then the Ennemie shal not dare to ingage himselfe in any Port, and so the Hope of Incurfion made frustrate. IV. To

IV. To the fourth, J am of Opinion that the Ennemie will not seeke to possesse any Port in the West, by Reason of the Impassibilitie of the Waies, and the Lenght of the March : Nether do J conceaue that they will Attempt the *Isle of Wight*, or any other Porte or Place of the South : For J holde it for a Principle, that there is no Ennemy so ill aduised to offer to holde any Place or Peece of Grounde vppon the Coast, where her Majestie with the helpe of the *Lowe Countries* may commande the Sea. The Reasonnes are manifold manifest, and therefore superfluous to insert. But that if any such Thing be intended, they will enter by the *Riuer of Thames*, and make Descent neere *London*, or at *London* it selfe. To preuent which J thincke it verie requisite to describe an Armye, that the same may be drawn together on the suddaine, and that there be a Magasine of Victuails for her Majesties Fleet made readie : And J am of Opinion vnder Correction, that the setting out of her Majesties Shippes by two or three at a Tyme, is not safe, for by that Tyme the last shall be prepared, the Victuail of the first shall be spent, and so there will be no able Strenght in Order at any Tyme. For if it proue an Inuasion, there wilbe Tyme geuen to prouyde sufficiently for all, if the Attempt be sudden, a lesser Number shall be in Danger of being lost or beaten.

V. To the 5th, J do not thincke it necessarie to fortifie any where but vppon the *Thames* : For the rest, ether the Ennemie will geue vs Tyme to prepare our Nauye, and then shall not neede, or he will geue us no Tyme, and then we shall but beginne a Worke of our owne Perills.

VI. To the 6th, *De hoc in campis consultabimur*, and those which shall command the Armie, when they shall see, what the Ennemy intendeth, themselves

selues with their Commanders of the Armie shall best iudge of necessarie Counterworckes.

VII. To the 7th, The Wayes to hinder any Ennemie from Progreffion are manifold, as by taken away all meane of Victuails, J meane such Prouision as shalbe of Corne, and the lyke by Carriage the rest a liue as Sheep, and Cattell, by driuing the Countrie with Light Horses. It hath ben also the Manner to make hedd upon the Straights to defend Passages, Bridges, and Ryuers with the lyke: Yet J do not finde that an Ennemie hath bene stayd in any Passage, ether in our or former Tymes upon an Inuasion. For the *Switzers* sought to impeach *Francis* the first Kinge in the Journey of *Italie*, but they fayled. The *Spaniards* resolved to impeach the Constable of *France* at *Suze*, where they had fortified themselues, but it auayled not. The Duke of *Guyse* passed the Riuer of *Bebamby*, notwithstanding that the *Spaniards* with an Armie on the other Bancke sought to giue Impediment. The Duke of *Lancaster* forced his Passag upon the Riuer of *Dyrne* in spight of the Armie of *Castile*. *Dandelot* past at *Orleans* in spight of the Erle of *Nemours*. And the Duke *Bepont* came ouer the *Loyre* in my owne Tyme in *France*, and War *La Charité* in spight of *d'Aumale*. So ded *Charles* the 5th on the Riuer *Elba* against the Duke of *Saxonie*, with many more to tedious and impertinent to remember.

VIII. To the 8th, To hazarde a Battaile which an Ennemie invading is verye dangerous, yet the Question hath bene largelye disputed among those that haue written of the Warres, but by the greater Partye helde perillous. Many Things may be said for both Opinions, but J will leaue to better Judgements; only J will remember this Principle, that the Invadour can loose nothing but his Men, the Defendant may loose the Kingdome; and that

withal the Defendant hath many Helpes by Tyme, the Invadour many Wants and Impediments.

IX. To the 9th, For our Stoare of Munition, I will leaue the Judgment to those whom it shall concerne, who are to deliuer in fytt Proportions both for Land and Sea: That any great Quantitie of Munition shall be leaft in any Place but *London*, I do not (for my poor conceit) much allowe of, because wee haue fewe Places guardable, *Portsmouth* excepted. That there be a Magasine of Victuail at this Tyme, and so long as her Majestie shall stand on Termes with *Spaine*, I thinck it most safest, and most necessarie Counsell of all other: For without it we can nether defend on the suddaine, nor Attempt any thing, without geuing the Ennemie sufficient Tyme to provide. And as it is said by those that haue written of the Warres, *Celui qui ne donne point d'ordre a la Munition des viures, veult estre vaincu sans cousteau.*

X. To the 10th, There may be used in the training of all such Numbers, as shal compound the Armies, such a Forme as shall annswere to a late Kynde of imbattellinge practised by the Erle of *Essex* in the Journey of *Cales*, or otherwise according to the Direction of the Generall of the Armie.

XI. To the 11th, I thincke it fytt that because the Armie may receaue soddayne Losse vppon any Encounter, that the Lieutenant Generall of the Armie may haue Commission to authorise any Lieutenant of the seuerall Counties, to send ether the one halfe or more of the Forces, within his Lieutenancy, because it may be dangerous to attende a second Warrant from her Majestie. But if it happen that the Ennemie take Land in any of the South or West Parts, I do not thincke it very dangerous to drawe the Strenght either from the East or West Countries together, and to

compound the Armie of those, but that the Strenght of the Countrie it selfe, in which the Ennemy maketh Descent, be only a Part of the generall Armie, and the rest to be taken from the Counties next adioyning Northward, and into the Lande; my Reason is, that an Ennemie coming into the Channell may by accident of Winde and Weather enter with his Fleet into such a Porte, where he hath no Determination to make the Warre. As for Exemple, if the Ennemie shal be dryuen into *Plymouth*, if wee then drawe thether the Forces of *Dorsett*, *Hampshire*, and *Suffex*, and uppon the change of Winde or Wether, the Ennemie proceede to the Eastwarde, and Land in any of those Countries so disfurnished, there can be no Resistance made by the rest remaininge, and before the proper Forces of the County can be recalled, the Ennemie shall haue Tyme, ether to destroy or possesse the same. Lastly, J thinck it vnder Correction very inconvenient, that all such Colonells, and Captens which now commands Regiments, and Companies in the Counties, should hold the same Commandment in the Armie: For besyds, that it will take away the Imployments of all our best Captens that followe the Warrs abroad, so will it with all breed great Confusion in the Armie, because that most of all those Gentlemen haue neuer seen the Warrs in any Sorte: And therefore J thinck it meet to leaue the Choise to the Lieutenant of the Armie, to allowe or chang of the one or the other at his Discretion. That the Lieutenant of the Countie into which the Lieutenant Generall of the Armie shall enter, be Lieutenant to the General of the Armie, J thincke it, a very wise and honourable Allowance and Consideration.

The Opinion of Sir George Carewe, Lieutenant of the Ordynance, concerning those Articles.

I. **A**Lbeit in euery Mans Judgement, there is no Question, but that the Spring of the Yeare is a Tyme more conuenient to cary an Armie ether by Land or Sea, then in the Depth of Winter : And specially for the Inuasion of an Iland, yet laying before us the Commodities that the King of *Spaine* gathers vnto himselfe by the hastye Preparation, and Winter Warre (vnder Reformation as well in this as in Annswere of all the other Questions) J thincke he cannot Counsell himselfe better then to Attempt us now, when wee are most vnprovidend and when our Haruests are in our Barnes, to geue him Relief, rather then by tarying for fair Weather to loose so faire an Aduantag, which he is sure to loose, if he geue us Tyme to preuent it.

II. The Example of 88 doth plainlie lay before us the Intent of the *Spanish* King. J thincke euery Man supposes that then he purposed a Conquest of *Englande* : His Ambition, desire of Reuenge, and Riches to effect his Desires is now more then before. And therefore it is most lyke that he intendes an Inuasion. For were his proiect no larger then an Incursion J am of an Opinion that he would tary for a better Season of the Yeare, of lesser Danger to his Fleet, then to hazarde the same in Winter Stormes, since at all Tymes he may anoye us by Incursions, which cannot be anoyded be wee neuer so watchfull. And further, if his Purpose were to infest us with an incursiue Warre, the same might be done with a lesse Armie, without Horsmen, then this which now he hath leuied. Or if he intended a lesse Conquest then *England* to holde

holde us in a longe chargeable Warre. *Ireland* were a fyttter Desseinge for such a Purpose, then to inuade us in our chieftest Strenght. The greatnes of his Fleet and Armie, which is to great for an Enterprise against *Ireland*, and the Qualitie of the *Adelantado* the Generall of the same respected, wee haue Reason to thincke that he propounds no other End vnto him selfe, then the Conquest of *England*. That he gathers his Forces together, and transports them in this Season of the Yeare to reinforce his *Lowe Country* Armie is verye vnlykelie, aswell in regarde that the same hath euer more been accustomed to be supplied ouer Land out of *Italye*, which is a safe Way, and of least Charge, as also that the Cardinals Armie is not so weake, but well able to make a defensive Warre, to keep what is gotten vntill the Spring of the Yeare being a Tyme more proper to transport Armies, then in the midst of Winter.

III. The Ennemie intending but an Incurfion wee are speciallie to prouide the strenghtning of those Places that are most lykelie to be attempted, and that is the West Parts of *England*, betweene the Lands Ende in *Cornwall* and *Portsmouth*, for the further that he shall come into the narrowe Seas, the neerer is his Fleet to Peril. The Place of all others most lyke to receaue harme is the Towne of *Plymouth*, to them a famous Place, for that from thence all Fleets haue departed that haue done them Greevance. *Dartmouth*, *Poole*, *Hamp-ton*, *Portsmouth*, and the *Ile of Wight* are also to be carefully regarded: For the guarding of which Places, the Order that was sett downe for the Defence of the maritime Townes in 88, I thinck meet to be followed, which in my Opinion, (so as the Countries be well supplied with Munition) neede not be altered.

IV. Be

III. Being granted that the Ennemie intendes an Inuasion, in reason wee must looke that he will choose to make his Descent in such a Place as may best accomodate him and annoy us: *Mildford*, an excellent good Haven, but seated in a poor Countrie, and a Blowe so farre from the Hart is not Mortal. *Bristoll* not to be feared, for the Riuer of *Seuerne* is full of Dangers, being in nether Syde of it a good Harbour. *Plymouth* will yeald many good Commodities, but for an Inuadour who apprehens in his Thoughts no lesse then a Kingdome, by Reason of the Countrie adjoyning is vnfit for an Inuading Armie to marche in, but with Disadvantage; I do rather beleeeve, that for the first he will pass by that Port and the Westerne Coast altogether, not once strykinge Sayle vntyll he come to an Auncor, either before *Portsmouth* or in *Southampton* Water, which Townes being taken (because one of them is fortified, and the other in Nature strongly seated) are easilie kept, from thence into the middest of the Realme or vnto *London*, a faire Way for an Armie to march, good Harbour for Ships ether to come in or goe out, and not far from *Calais* or *Britagne* as Occasions shal require, to haue Ayde from thence, ether of Men, Munition or Victualls.

IV. The *Isle of Wight* (of all other Places next adjoyning vnto *Portsmouth* and *Southampton*) is most needful to be respected, and though it is not possible to garde all Places of an Iland in such sorte, so as an Ennemie shal be vnable to make a Descent into it: Yet in a small Iland some one conuenient Place in the same is meet to be stronglie fortified, that may be able to resist the Ennemie, and at all Tymes geue Securitie for the Landing of our Forces, Munitions, and Victualls, for a litle Iland taken by an Ennemie not hauing a Fortification, that is able to geue such Safetie, is hardly to be

be recouered. *Portlande* lykewise an Iland strong by Nature, which with little helpe of Arte would be made impregnable, once gotten by the Ennemy, will geue him many Commodities, and vs Annoyance, and therefore is meet to be streightned.

V. The Ennemie being possessed of a Commodious Porte, and fortified in the same, it were needful that a Royall Fleet were sett out, to forbydd Supplies by Seas, and lykewise an Armye by Lande to keep him from Reliefe out of the Countrey, by which Means when the Prouisions brought with him is expended, of Necessity he must gayn the Place: The Cannon will make a speedier Dispatch, but this other Way (where better Leaseure may be taken) I holde to be a Course, more honorable, safe and wyse.

The best Way to geue Impediment to an Ennemie to enforce him to marche slowly is to breake downe all the Bridges before him, to fight with him uppon euery Straight or Place of Advantage, and in the Plaines to charge him with Horsemen, sometymes in one Part of his Armie, sometymes an other, as occasion shall best require: Which Disturbances no Ennemies Army can auoyd that is weaker in Horse, but shal be inforced euery half quarter of an Hour to make Hault.

There is nothing so perillous to a Kingdom invaded (not inforced by meere Necessitie) as to hazard Battail when it may be auoided, nor nothing in Pollicye better agreeing with the State of an Invadour then the contrarie, if possible he may procure it. The Reasons are apparant, for that the one in loosing the Victorie (besydes the losse of Men) may endanger a Kingdom, whereas the other in loosing the Battail looseth but Men only, which with often Skirmissing, Sicknes, want of Cloathes and Victuails (inconueniences and wants euermore incydent to Jnuadors) will in a smal Tyme

Tyme consume of themselves : And therefore in my Judgment, it is not good at any Tyme to hazard the Danger of a Battaylle, vnlesse wee be enforced vnto it, or that the Generall in his Wyldome find such apparant Reasones, that (vnlesse God fight against us) wee must of Necessity be Victors. The Tyme when Battaill is best to be aduentured cannot be lymited, but as occasion shall minister it.

IX. Whether this Question hath Reference to a Stoare of Munition, and Victuail euermore to be kept in readines for a Royall Staple for the whole Realme, or vnto an Armye only to be expended for the present; for that J may be mistaken, I will aunswer vnto them both. Butt because the Stoare of all Natures of Munitions fytt to be prouided, will make a large Booke, J will deale only with the principal Munition Powder, of which Prouision (if this Invasion expected to be performed, and that a long Warre as is most lyke do ensue) her Majesties Stoare need to be very great, for if wee be enforced to Leuie two Armies as was intended in 88, there is nether of these Armies for great Ordinance and small Shott, that will require lesse then 100 Lastes of Powder. If her Majesties whole Fleet at the same Tyme do goe to the Seas, little lesse then a 100 Lasts will furnishe them out: To supplye *Irelande*, *Barwycke*, the Ilands, the Castles upon the Coastes, which may not want as occasion is offered, 100 Lasts in Stoare will scarcely suffice. As touching Victuails the same in my Jugement is very difficult to Proportion, vntill the Tyme, and Numbers of Men be agreed upon. But for the Places most meet to keepe Magasins, in which are lyke to be of most Use and Safetie in this *Spanish* Warre, are *Portsmouth*, *London*, *Rochester*, *Exceter* lykewise is well seated for a Magasine, but not so safe as the rest, and therefore

not

not to be used except Necessitye doe extreamely urge it.

X. The Orders agreed upon in 88, J am not well acquainted with them, and therefore forbear to speake further to that Question.

XI. Jn my Opinion. It is not fytt to limitt her Majesties Lieutenant, what Nombres more or lesse he will frame his Armie of, or to change them as shall see Cause: For if she geve him the leading of her Armie, she doth repute and know him to be a Man of Faith, Judgement, and Wisedom, and being such a one (in Martiall Affaires) what may be doubted, or what more can be required?

Summary of certain Obseruations of sundry Opinions deliuered by the Lords and others Committees, for to consult upon the Preparation of the Spanishe Armye

Differences. **T**HE more Part, upon Credit to the Aduertisement, do thinck the Armye is provided to make a plain Invasion.

Some thinck he will only make but some Incursions to borne and spoile some Part of the Sea Coast, for avendge of *Cales*.

Many that thinck it to be intended an Invasion, do holde that it shall be by invading the *Ile of Wight*, *Portesmouth*, and *Southampton*, or els to enter into the Riuer of *Thames*, and to shoot at *London*.

Accordances almost of all.

That the Ennemye will now attempt the Enterprise, though it be in Winter, because the Queenes Navye is not or cannot be speedily ready to empeach them, and besydes that this their comming at this Tyme will be vnlooked for, and therefore the Preparations will not be ready in Tyme to withstand them.

Therefore they all agree, that without Delay all the Forces especially upon the West and South Coast be putt in Readynes, and that they be viewed by Men of Knowledge, to be furnished both with their full Numbers, and their Armor and Weapon.

All do accord, that there must be sundry Armies compounded of the Forces of the Countrey. And therefore these Things particularly following are to be provided.

First, a sufficient Quantitie of Victuail, to be provided, and the Staple thereof to be principally at *London*; and some Portion at *Portesmouth*, and some at *Exeter* to serue for the Armies, as they shal be leuyed either in the East or in the West.

Item, A Prouision also to be made of Plenty of Powder, whereof some thinck lesse cannot be then 400 Lasts, and a Proportion also of Matche agreeable thereto, the one halfe to be in Staple at *London*, the other, Part at *Southampton*, and Part at *Exeter*.

It is also thought convenient to have Prouision of Armes and Weapons to serue for 2000 Men, the same also to be deuided, as the Powder shall be; which Armes and Weapons are to serue for the Multitudes of able Men in euery Countie, that are not Part of the Trayned Bands.

Item, All agree to haue the Towne, Isle, and Fort at *Plymouth* to be furnished with sufficient Numbers of Men, and likewise they thinck meet to haue the Towne of *Southampton* put in Safetie by making some Raueling, or Sconce at the Entry of the Haven.

They would also haue some Place in the *Isle of Wight* ouer against *Hurst* to be fortified and guarded, to serue for a safe Landing of Succours to be sent from *Hurst*,

It is also necessarye with Speede to describe as many Armies to withstand the Ennemie, as the Forces

Forces of the Countries of the Maritime Counties and of the Countries thereto, ioyning may conveniently yeald, which could be done by the present View of the Musterbookes; and for better vnderstanding of the Truth of the said Bookes, both for the Nombers and Abilitie of the Persons certified, and of their Armor and Weapons: It is thought necessary to haue speciall Persons sent into euery County, out of which the Armies are to compounded, to View exactly the Numbers so certified with their Armor and Weapon, and the Defects therein to be speedily supplied by the Authoritye of the Lieutenant of the County. And to th'intent the said Armies may be made Complete, it is necessary to determine, who shal haue the principal Charge of the Government, and Conduct thereof, as her Majesties Lieutenant-Generall.

Item, For all particular Aduises, how to impeach the Ennemy from Landing, or how to distresse him being Landed, or to fight or skirmish with them to weaken them, and how the Numbers assembled for the Armies shal be distributed and disciplined and conducted to fight; all such particular Actions must be referred to the Direction of the General Lieutenant, and other Officers of the Field; which Actions of Seruices must be guided, as the Circumstances both of the Ennemies Forces, and of the Places shall require to haue the Ennemy assayed.

Item, Such as do feare the Invasion by entering into the *Thames*, doe thinck it necessarye to impeach the same by these, or lyke Meanes following.

By prouiding of a Number of Hoyes to crosse the *Thames* about *Grauesend*, and they to be fortified and furnished well with great Artillery to batter the Ennemy.

Some do thinck that a good Number of Westerne Barges were laden with Wood, and hollow Places
in

in the same to couer some Numbers of Men, with Musket Shott, who might first offend the Ennemy therewith, and then to saue themselves in small Boates to hang at the Tayle of the Barges: And hauing Prouision of some fier Worckes ready, then to sett the same Barges, and Wood on Fier at such Tyme, as with Tyde the saied Barges might set the Ennemies Nauy on Fire.

Some doe adde hereto a Deuise to make a Strenght lyke a Sconce at a Point of Land betwixt *Greenwich* and *Blackwall*, and there to Plant some good Number of Ordynance to shoot both Trauers the Riuer, and along the Reache.

Some also would haue more of those Sconces upon som other Points of the Land on either Side of the *Thames*, where the Channels doe runne.

Diuers other particular Things are thought of verye necessarie to be putt in Execution by the Order of him that shall be Lieutenant-General, and other Officers of the Field joyned with him.

F I N I S.

